SSL Everywhere & SSL Security Chas Lesley Field

SSL Everywhere & SSL Security Chas Lesley Field

SSL Everywhere & SSL Security Chas Lesley Field Systems Engineer Tony Ganzer Territory Account Manager AGENDA (1)Introductions (2)SSL Background (3)Full Proxy & HUD Filter Chain (4)SSL Profile: Ciphers &Configuration (5)SSL Profile: Client Authentication (6)SSL Profile: Forward Proxy & SSL Intercept (7)Question & Answer (8)Wrap-Up (Next User Group) Every environment is at different levels We dont know everything, Everyone needs to contribute. F5 Networks, Inc 3

SSL General Warnings IMPORTANT: F5s TMOS is capable of rendering multiple SSL Cipher Suites. Configuring weaker suites should only be done for testing purposes only. These should be removed as soon as testing is complete. IMPORTANT: Depending on the elected cipher suites, the SSL TPS (Transactions Per Second) can be affected. Understand your specifc application and TPS requirements and ensure any cipher suite is compatible with the targeted application and capabilities of the platform. IMPORTANT: Altering SSL Cipher Suites impacts the breadth of browsers and platforms that can supported. Understand the impacts and plan accordingly. Liability Release Complete As with any system, understand it before you use it F5 Networks, Inc 4 Trajectory and Growth of Encryption SSL growing ~30% annually. Entering the Fifth wave of transition (IoE) MARKET AMPLIFIERS Millions of Certificates (CA) 3.5 Customer Trends: 3.0

2.5 2.0 E-Commerce Privacy 1.5 1.0 0.5 F5 Networks, Inc PFS/ECC Demanded SSL Labs Application Scoring IoE Emerging Standards: TLS 1.3, HTTP 2.0/SPDY RSA -> ECC Thought Leaders and Influence:

0.0 Source: Netcraft Mobilit y S n o w d e n Years Google: SHA2, SPDY, Search Ranking by Encryption Microsoft: PFS Mandated 5 F5 Networks, Inc 6

HTTPS:// ENCRYPTALLTHETHINGS.NET/ F5 Networks, Inc 7 http2 F5 Networks, Inc 8 F5 Networks, Inc 9 F5 Networks, Inc 10 F5 Networks, Inc 11 The SSL Landscape is Changing, Rapidly 98% SUPPORT FOR SSLV3 SEP 2014 ~ 26%

SUPPORT FOR SSL V3 TODAY > 33% SUPPORT FOR FORWARD SECRECY David Holmes. RSA 2015. https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/rsa2015-ssl-everywhere-feat-holmes F5 Networks, Inc 12 SSL & the FULL Proxy Some quick reminders SSL Visibility/Intercept A Reverse Proxy sits between the user and an application and can do things like caching, load balancing, and security on behalf of the app. A Forward Proxy sits between the user and an application and does things like caching and stopping you from using Facebook at work. F5 Networks, Inc 14

BIG-IP Architecture HUD Filter Chain (Proxy Chain) Intelligent Full Proxy Benefits Clients Clients Data Data Center Center App App point point of of delivery delivery & & definition definition BIG-IP Platform App App Intelligence Intelligence -- layer layer 33- 77 HUD Filter Chain visibility visibility Distinct Distinct client client // server

server control control Unified Unified services services // context context Interoperability Interoperability and and gateway gateway T C P S S L H T T P P R O X Y H T T

P S S L T C P functions functions HUD chains are a series of filters which implement the configuration. The HUD chain is divided into two halves, client and server side. Filters on HUD chains usually are arranged as client/server pairs. The two halves are joined by the proxy. F5 Networks, Inc 15 BIG-IP Architecture SSL Termination (SSL Offloading & SSL Bridging) Intelligent Full Proxy Benefits Clients Clients

Data Data Center Center App App point point of of delivery delivery & & definition definition BIG-IP Platform App App Intelligence Intelligence -- layer layer 33- 77 HUD Filter Chain visibility visibility Distinct Distinct client client // server server control control Unified Unified services services // context context

Interoperability Interoperability and and gateway gateway T C P S S L H T T P P R O X Y H T T P S S L

T C P functions functions Each SSL filter handles connection to device on their side of the proxy. Normally, the two SSL filters operate completely independently. Between the two filters, all data is available unencrypted. To fully offload the backend server, remove the server side SSL filter. F5 Networks, Inc 16 BIG-IP Architecture Forward SSL Forward SSL Proxy Benefits Clients Clients Data Data Center Center Inspect

Inspect secure secure traffic traffic at at network network BIG-IP Platform edge edge HUD Filter Chain Transparent Transparent to to the the end end user user Policy Policy based based bypass bypass by: by: Source Source IP IP Address Address Destination Destination IP IP Address Address Host

Host Name Name (SAN,CN,SNI) (SAN,CN,SNI) T C P S S L H T T P P R O X Y H T T P

S S L T C P Forward SSL is used in Forward Proxy deployments. Just in time certificate creation is used to decrypt SSL connections. Enables policy based inspection of secure content. Requires the ability to create trusted certificates to work. F5 Networks, Inc 17 Where is the HUD Filter Chain in the GUI? TCP Client and Server Profile HTTP Profile SSLClient Client and SSL and Server Server Profile Profile F5 Networks, Inc

18 Exploring the SSL Profile (Client & Server) Configuration Spend most of our time here We will cover: Cipher Suites Cipher Syntax SSL Lab Scores Client & Server Profiles Client Authentication Cover quick User Certificate Authentication PKI Cert use case SSL Forward Proxy General Overview of SSL Intercept and Forward Proxy use cases F5 Networks, Inc 19 Ciphers Suites & Configuration What is SSL? The history of SSL and TLS SSL1 and SSL2 Created by Netscape and contained significant flaws 1994

SSL3 Created by Netscape to address SSL2 flaws 1995 TLS 1.0 Standardized SSL3 with almost no changes RFC2246 1999 TLS 1.1 Security fixes and TLS extensions RFC4346 2006 TLS 1.2 Added support for authenticated encryption (AES-GCM, CCM modes) and removed hard-coded primitives RFC5246 2008

Crap hits the fan First set of public SSL exploits F5 Networks, Inc 21 SSL isnt perfect - SSL vulnerabilities exposed August 2009 Insecure renegotiation vulnerability exposes all SSL stacks to DoS attack RFC 5746 TLS extension for secure renegotiation quickly mainstreamed February 2010 August 2009 BEAST & CRIME Lucky 13 Client-side or MITB Another timing attack attacks leveraging a chosen-plaintext flaw in

TLS 1.0 and TLS compression flaws September 2011 RC4 Attacks TIME Weakness in CBC A refinement and cipher making plaintext variation of CRIME guessing possible February 2013 March 2013 Heartbleed The end of the Internet as we know it! March 2013 April 2014 POODLE Padding oracle attack on SSLv3

Dire POODLE Padding oracle attack on TLS FREAK Implementation attack on export ciphers OpenSSL NSS GnuTLS CVE-2014-0160 CVE-2014-1544 CVE-2014-3566 F5 Networks, Inc Apple Microsoft CVE-2014-1295 CVE-2014-6332 Secure Transport SCHANNEL LogJam Implementation attack on weak DH 22

IETF TLS Best Practices [RFC 7525] Must Should Negotiate TLS v1.2 Prefer Strict TLS over StartTLS Support HSTS Use HSTS (unless it weakens security or Support SNI first contact not trusted) Offer Forward Secrecy, such as DHE and Disable TLS encryption ECDHE Use public keys of at least 2048 bit Should Not Must Not Negotiate TLS v1.0 or v1.1 Negotiate SSL v2 or v3 Negotiate less than 128 bit ciphers

Fall back to SSL v3 or older Negotiate static RSA ciphers Negotiate NULL cipher F5 Networks, Inc (TLS_RSA_WITH_*), no support Negotiate RC4* for Forward Secrecy Negotiate Export Grade crypto (min 112bit) 23 Getting an A+ on SSL Labs Disable SSLv3 [B] & RC4 [B/C] Replace any SHA1 Certs [A] and sub-2k Certs [C] Enable TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV [A] Enable HTTP Strict Transport [A] Enable and Prefer Perfect Forward Secrecy Compatible Ciphers [A-] Do not use DHE ciphers (only ECDHE). DHE ciphers will cap the grade at [B] on BIG-IP. Enable TLS1.2 [C] Enable Secure Renegotiation [A-] Patch for POODLE variants (TMOS 114.1 HF7+, 11.5.1 HF7+, 11.5.2 or 11.6.0) [C or F]

F5 Networks, Inc *There are a many more requirements such as validating cert chain, domain and so on that are not generally well understood. See the Guide for details: Qualys SSL Labs Rating Guide: https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/rating-guide/i ndex.html 24 Cipher Suites Broken Down Key Exchange Algorithm used to determine if and how the client and server will authenticate during the handshake. Authentication The algorithm used for key cryptography (ex RSA, DSS, ECDSA) F5 Networks, Inc 25 Cipher Suites Broken Down Cipher The bulk encryption algorithm used to encrypt the message

stream. It also includes the key size and the lengths of explicit and implicit initialization vectors. Message Authentication Code Used to create the message digest, a cryptographic hash of each block of the message stream. F5 Networks, Inc 26 Cipher Suites Broken Down Cipher Suite A cipher suite is a named combination of key exchange algorithms, authentication, cipher encryption and message authentication code (MAC) used to negotiate the security settings for a network connection using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) / Secure Sockets Layer

(SSL) network protocols. F5 Networks, Inc 27 Cipher Strings - Operators Colon (:) The colon character : is the delimiter between two cipher string phases. When used as part of a list, it is simply the additive operator For example the cipher string RSA:AES means All RSA-based ciphers plus all AES-based ciphers and would include over 100 ciphers! Plus (+) The plus sign operator + has two uses. When used between two cipher names, the + operator doesnt mean add, it means the intersection of The cipher string RSA+AES means specifically just 11 ciphers that have RSA as the key exchange and AES as the encryption cipher F5 Networks, Inc 28 Cipher Strings - Operators Leading Plus (:+) When used in front of a cipher name (that is, after a colon), the plus sign means move these ciphers to the end of the list For example, RSA:RC4 and RSA:+RC4 will provide the same list of ciphers, but the latter will order RC4-based ciphers at the end of the list as least preferred Minus (-)

The minus operator - deletes the ciphers from the list of supported ciphers while making sure that some or all of the ciphers can be added again with later options. The ! operator is used more commonly than the minus For example , RSA:-SHA:DHE+SHA means all RSA-based ciphers except those that use SHA plus all DHE-based ciphers that include SHA Do not confuse the minus with the hyphen character- F5 Networks, Inc 29 Cipher Strings - Operators Not (!) The not operator ! permanently deletes ciphers from the list of the supported ciphers The ciphers deleted can never reappear in the list even if they are explicitly stated. For example, RSA:!MD5:MD5 is effectively the same as RSA At (@) The at operator @ specifies that the following word will designate whether the cipher string is to order the list of cryptographic strength (@STRENGTH) or cryptographic performance (@SPEED) No Symbol If none of the above symbols appears in the string, the string is interpreted as a list of ciphers to be appended to the current preference list If the list includes any ciphers already present, they will be ignored F5 Networks, Inc 30 Cipher Strings - Special Keywords DEFAULT This is the ordered list of preferred ciphers as determined by the F5 security

engineering team It is different from the OpenSSL DEFAULT keyword F5 optimizes DEFAULT to be a reasonable compromise between high security and high performance tmm The F5clientciphers engineering team DEFAULT agonizes over the list of ciphers that make up the DEFAULT in each release The main drawback to using a DEFAULT is that when it changes (as new ciphers are developed or old ones fall out of favor), administrators that use DEFAULT may be surprised when they upgrade versions. In version 12.0 of the BIG-IP system, the following unsafe ciphers are excluded from DEFAULT and are unlikely to comeback: EXPORT, SSL3, and NULL F5 Networks, Inc 31 Cipher Strings - Special Keywords NATIVE (F5 SSL Stack) The NATIVE keyword specifies the set of ciphers that are specially accelerated either in hardware or software in the F5 SSL stack. The performance and support of NATIVE ciphers are much higher then nonNATIVE ciphers. The NATIVE cipher list includes ciphers that have since been shown to be inappropriately weak for modern use (such as RC4, MD5, and DES). These latter ciphers should be enabled with caution. COMPAT (OpenSSL) The COMPAT cipher invokes a special mode for a handful of ciphers where the implementation is borrowed directly from the open source OpenSSL project to support legacy system that could not be upgraded. Today, COMPAT should only be used very rarely, under specific guidance, when

there is no other alternative. F5 Networks, Inc 32 Cipher Strings - Special Keywords HIGH, MEDIUM, and LOW These keywords are largely maintained only for the purposes of compatibility. The HIGH string includes ciphers with 128-bit keys or larger, but in reality, HIGH is less secure than DEFAULT. Note that HIGH includes anonymous Diffe-Hellman ciphers, which should not be used by production systems. The MEDIUM keyword includes export encryption algorithms, including 40and 56- bit algorithms. These ciphers were defined to comply with U.S. export rules that have since been lifted. EXPORT The EXPORT keyword is most useful when preceded by the Not (!) operator. F5 Networks, Inc 33 Cipher Strings - Examples This cipher string prioritizes elliptic-curve ciphers (EC). EC ciphers are thought to be easier on mobile devices The Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) cipher invokes forward secrecy By specifying DHE+AES, some SSLv3 ciphers get brought back in. The final SSLv3:-RC4 removes them: ECDHE+AES-GCM:ECDHE+AES:ECDHE+3DES:DHE+AES-GCM: DHE+AES:DHE+3DES:RSA+AES-GCM:RSA+AES:RSA+3DES: -MD5:-SSLv3:-RC4 F5 Networks, Inc

34 SSL Profile [Envelope for a Certificate/Key pair] Two Profiles Types: Client Client (Client (Client to to F5) F5) Server Server (F5 (F5 to to pool pool member) member) Requires: Certificate Certificate Key Key [chain] [chain] (if (if needed) needed) Advanced for Cipher Suites Note: You Can use the same SSL Cert/Key with multiple profiles F5 Networks, Inc 35

SSL Labs & Cipher Demo SSL Client-Side SSL Labs Score Card (https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/) Really Bad Day at the Office Took Took aa little little bit bit of of work work to to disable disable native native security security (11.x/12.x) (11.x/12.x) Certainly Certainly not not recommended recommended May May be be subject subject to to configuration, configuration, version

version of of code code and and hotfixes hotfixes (older (older versions) versions) Cipher String Used SSLv3:RC4:SSLv2:!TLSv1:!TLSv1_1:! TLSv1_2 F5 Networks, Inc 37 SSL Labs Score Card (https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/) Bad Day at the Office Better Better than than aa F F Took Took aa little little bit bit of of work work to to disable disable native

native security security (11.x/12.x) (11.x/12.x) May May be be subject subject to to configuration, configuration, version version of of code code and and hotfixes hotfixes (older (older versions) versions) Cipher String Used SSLv3:RC4:SSLv2:TLSv1:TLSv1_1:! TLSv1_2 F5 Networks, Inc 38 SSL Labs Score Card (https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/) Better Day at the Office Now

Now we we are are above above average! average! No No Work. Work. DEFAULT DEFAULT cipher cipher (12.x) (12.x) Good Good starting starting point point Cipher String Used DEFAULT F5 Networks, Inc 39 SSL Labs Score Card (https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/) Good Day at the Office Little Little Work. Work. DEFAULT DEFAULT cipher cipher (12.x)

(12.x) ++ ECDHE ECDHE and and removed removed DHE DHE Prioritizes Prioritizes Perfect Perfect Forward Forward Secrecy Secrecy (PFS) (PFS) Perfect Forward Secrecy is a mechanism offered by Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHE or ECDHE) and TLS that prevents decryption of SSL-protected communications if the server private key is compromised. F5 Networks, Inc Good Good coverage coverage of of browsers/OS browsers/OS Cipher String Used ECDHE:DEFAULT:!DHE 40 SSL Labs Score Card

(https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/) Way to Go Day at the Office DEFAULT DEFAULT cipher cipher (12.x) (12.x) ++ ECDHE ECDHE and and removed removed DHE DHE Prioritizes Prioritizes PFS PFS Added Added HSTS HSTS Good Good coverage coverage of of Declares to browsers that they must use https to connect (browser convert all http links to https) Stops users from clicking through certificate security warnings (disallows cert exemptions, self-signed, mismatch, etc) Need for A+ on score card RFC 6797 Previously done via iRule, now in GUI (12.x) F5 Networks, Inc browsers/OS browsers/OS HSTS Profile Endabled

Cipher String Used ECDHE:DEFAULT:!DHE 41 SSL Labs Score Card (https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/) Over Achiever Security Security versus versus compatibility compatibility Significantly Significantly reduces reduces browsers/OS browsers/OS coverage coverage 4K Key required to score 100. LetsEncrypt only issues 2K Keys F5 Networks, Inc HSTS Profile ECDHE:DEFAULT:!DHE:!RSA:!SHA1:!SHA256:!TLSv1:! TLSv1_1:!ADH 42 F5 Networks, Inc

(https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/) Extreme Normal SSL Labs Score Card 43 Server-Side SSL SSL Bridging Server-Side SSL Profiles (SSL Bridging) serverssl No certs required in profile More (auth) Security Certs required on pool severssl-insecureincompatible More Accessibilit y member !SSLv2:!EXPORT:! DH:RSA+RC4:RSA+AES:RSA+DES: RSA+3DES:ECDHE+AES:ECDHE+3D

ES:@SPEED Can be internal PKI Certs Additional security available with server-side Certificate authentication F5 Networks, Inc 45 Server-Side SSL Profiles (SSL Bridging) SSL Profile (Client-Side) Required Required for for SSL SSL Termination Termination Referred Referred to to as as SSL SSL Offloading Offloading SSL Profile (Server-Side)

Required Required for for re-encryption re-encryption to to pool pool member member Generally Generally recommend recommend built-in built-in profile profile unless unless there there is is aa specific specific need need F5 Networks, Inc Referred Referred to to aa SSL SSL Bridging Bridging 46

Certificate Authentication SSL Bridging SSL Client Authentication Client Client Certificate Certificate Requirement: Requirement: Require Require Request Request Ignore Ignore Root/Issuing Root/Issuing CA CA that that will will validate validate client client certificate certificate Root/Issuing Root/Issuing CA CA that that will will validate validate client client certificate certificate

F5 Networks, Inc 48 SSL Client Authentication On Demand (APM) Client Client Certificate Certificate Requirement: Requirement: Require Require Request Request Ignore Ignore Root/Issuing Root/Issuing CA CA that that will will validate validate client client certificate certificate Root/Issuing Root/Issuing CA CA that that will will validate validate client client certificate

certificate F5 Networks, Inc 49 Access Policy On Demand Certificate Authentication F5 Networks, Inc 50 SSL Intercept (Forward Proxy) Exsiting & Emerging Technologies Without SSL Decryption Security Solutions lack Visibility Legitimate User Allow tcp:80 [HTTP] Allow tcp:443 [HTTPS] Legitimate User Malicious Attacker Applications at Risk Hijacked Browser F5 Networks, Inc SSL protects traffic from inspection (privacy), but also protects attacks from

inspection 52 Perfect Forward Secrecy & Continued Visibility IPS/IDS/WAF solutions that rely on MITM / RSA Ciphers are not going to work in the PFS world Passive tap or layer 2 bump in the wire mode of deployments will not work in a PFS world Will require inline reverse/full proxy implementation F5 Networks, Inc 53 SSL Visibility Solution Overview Perimeter Services Visibility and Control Inspection Services SSL Visibility SSL Decryption + Traffic Steering Application Services Resources

SSL Encryption + Load Balancing Legitimate Apps Users BIG-IP System Malicious BIG-IP System Attackers Scale SSL across multiple security devices that are either blind or challenged with SSL performance to defend against encrypted threats Policy Enforcemen t Security Services Scale-Out for Growth

IPS DLP SWG Any Security Defense-inDepth F5 Networks, Inc 54 The first SSL Intercept implementation Release Candidate 5 and version 1.0 (iApp) One-box SSL Intercept Client Client BIG-IP BIG-IP Ingress Out Out Egress Inspection Zone

L3 L3 Services Services HTTP header signaling from ingress to egress Limited security service support in the iApp Static service chaining Simple and still valuable The basis of many interesting customer solutions Two-box SSL Intercept Client Client BIG-IP BIG-IP Inspection Zone Ingress Ingress Egress Egress L2

L2 Services Services F5 Networks, Inc BIG-IP BIG-IP Out Out L3 L3 Services Services 55 The first SSL Intercept implementation Version 1.0 derivatives One-box SSL Intercept Client BIG-IP Ingress Inspection Zone Advanced Advanced

Firewall Firewall Secure SecureWeb Web Gateway Gateway L3 Services SSL Forward Proxy handshakes + Explicitly bypassed SSL traffic Failure bypass Client Client BIG-IP BIG-IP FireEye FireEye FireEye FireEye Ingress Ingress Failure bypass Service Service Point Point

Proxy Chaining BlueCoat BlueCoat BlueCoat BlueCoat Decryption ICAP DLP ICAP DLP ICAP DLP ICAP DLP Devices Devices Devices Devices F5 Networks, Inc BIG-IP BIG-IP Route -> Egress

Egress Out Out Re-encryption Passive PassiveTap Tap Devices Devices Reporting Reporting Services Services Out Egress ICAP DLP ICAP DLP ICAP DLP ICAP DLP Devices Devices Devices

Devices SSL Intercept is typically deployed as a single or HA pair of devices It can also be deployed as separate devices, in which case the egress point is physically separated from ingress, providing an additional (physical) inspection zone and doubled SSL/TLS throughput 56 Building an SSL Intercept solution How decrypted inline traffic passes from ingress to egress RD0 VLAN (source) Self-IP (ex. 1.1.1.1/24) Inline InlineL2 L2 Services Services Pool Pooltototarget targetVLAN VLANSELF-IP SELF-IP

Pool (1.1.1.2:0) Target Source Clients Clients RD1 VLAN (target) Self-IP (ex. 1.1.1.2%1/24) VIP (0.0.0.0%1:0) Single Single BIG-IP BIG-IP Out Out Route domain strict isolation disabled Source VLAN connected to the inbound interface of the security device F5 Networks, Inc Target VLAN connected to the outbound interface of the security device Source and target self-IPs in the same unique subnet Source-side pool that points to the target VLAN self-IP (without route domain ID) Each L2 security device constitutes a separate set of VLANs, self-IPs, VIP and

pool Load balancing L2 devices is a function of adding all of the target self-IPs to a 57 The new SSL Intercept implementation Version 1.5 (iApp) F5 Networks, Inc 58 The new SSL Intercept implementation Version 1.5 (iApp) ICAP ICAP Services Services Inline InlineL2 L2 Services Services Inspection Zone In Clients Clients

BIG-IP BIG-IP Ingress In Ingress Inspection Zone Out Out Cleartext Zone Additional Additional L3 Security L3 Security Services Services Services Services BIG-IP BIG-IP Egress Egress Out Out

Inline InlineL3 L3 Services Services Receive Receive Only Only Services Services F5 Networks, Inc 59 The new SSL Intercept implementation Version 1.5 (iApp) ICAP ICAP Services Services Inline InlineL2 L2 Services Services Protocol-agnostic signaling

Inspection Zone In Clients Clients BIG-IP BIG-IP Ingress In Ingress Out Cleartext Zone Out Additional Additional L3 Security L3 Security Services Services Services Services Inspection Zone

Classification Engine Source IP Destination IP IP intelligence IP geolocation Domain name URL filtering category Destination port Protocol F5 Networks, Inc Inline InlineL3 L3 Services Services Receive Receive Only Only Services Services

BIG-IP BIG-IP Egress Egress Out Out Service Chaining chainX chainY bypass reject 60 Building an SSL Intercept solution How decrypted inline traffic passes from ingress to egress ROUT ROUT E

E ROUTE ROUTE Ingress Ingress BIG-IP BIG-IP Clients Clients ROUT ROUT E E Inline InlineL3 L3 Services Services ROUTE ROUTE Egress Egress BIG-IP BIG-IP Inline InlineL2

L2 Services Services Out Out ROUTE ROUTE ROUTE ROUTE Ingress Ingress BIG-IP BIG-IP Clients Clients ROUTE ROUTE Egress Egress BIG-IP BIG-IP Out Out Inline

InlineL3 L3 Services Services ROUTE ROUTE Clients Clients ROUTE ROUTE Single Single BIG-IP BIG-IP Out Out Inline InlineL3 L3 Services Services F5 Networks, Inc 61 Building an SSL Intercept solution How decrypted inline traffic passes from ingress to egress Directly

Connected ICAP ICAP Services Services Inline InlineL2 L2 Services Services Route Across Inspection Zone In Clients Clients BIG-IP BIG-IP Ingress In Ingress Out Out

Inspection Zone Inline InlineL3 L3 Services Services Directly Connected F5 Networks, Inc Cleartext Zone Additional Additional L3 Security L3 Security Services Services Services Services BIG-IP BIG-IP Egress Egress Out Out

Route Across or through Route Through Receive Receive Only Only Services Services 62 Validated Solutions and iApps Good reads! https://f5.com/solutions/enterprise/reference-architectures/ssl-everywhere https://devcentral.f5.com/articles/high-performance-intrusion-prevention F5 Networks, Inc 63 F5 Networks, Inc 64 T Questions

F5 Networks, Inc 65 T Thank you for you time F5 Networks, Inc 66

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